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equality when it is indexed
to how much each individual
contributes to stabilising the
group identity? Is the applica-
tion of equality as a priority
to those who best satisfy the
expectations of the political
community in terms of iden-
tity justifiable? Far from being
purely theoretical, these ques-
tions arise in public debates
around very concrete issues.
Calls in France and elsewhere
in Europe for “national pref-
erence” in the allocation of
social benefits and employ-
ment, and the measures advocated in the name of
“America first!” show just how far the desire to
secure the identity of the national community has
affected the principle of equality. Exhortations to
publicly acknowledge Europe’s “Christian roots”,
the need to protect “Britishness” asserted in support
of “Brexit” and hostile reactions to the arrival of
migrants and refugees from the Middle East and
many parts of Africa further illustrate growing fears
that the identity deemed to be constitutive of what
unites “us” in the political community shall be lost.
Pursuing equality in the attribution of rights
and distribution of goods while also subject-
ing this aim to the imperative of securing iden-
tity is problematic and contradictory. Of course,
tensions between identity and equality are well
known. They have been covered from different
perspectives in critiques of multiculturalism (Benn
Michaels 2009; Goodhart 2004) that argue that
when the promotion of diver-
sity is taken too far it damages
equality. As a result of these
critiques, identity has changed
sides, as it were, with the
rise of an identity politics that
no longer addresses minori-
ties, but rather demands pro-
tection for the values, goods,
and lifestyle that shape the col-
lective identity of the majority
group. What has changed here
is that the tensions between
identity and equality stem
from a vision of “us” that is
not too thin and plural but,
on the contrary, too thick and uniform. This is a
vision of the political community where the demand
for unity and indeed integrity in terms of identity is
strong to the point that it puts equality at risk.
This article seeks to examinate the impact
that attempts to secure the majority identity can
have on the way in which the principle of equality
itself is understood. To analyse the philosophi-
cal implications of subordinating equality to the
majority group’s expectations in terms of identity,
I shall consider the critiques formulated by the
so-called “communitarian” thinkers in the 1980s
and 90s in relation to the liberal conception of
equality and, in particular, of distributive justice
as developed notably by John Rawls (1971). After
a short discussion of the way in which equality can
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be understood in terms of justice, I shall detail the
objections made by the communitarian authors to
Rawlsian liberalism. I shall show that their con-
ception of equality and distributive justice is based
on a “constitutive” vision of community belonging,
a principle of “indebtedness” to the community
and a reappropriation of the virtue of merit, which
the communitarians define as “desert”. All these
notions converge in a “proportional” conception of
equality that draws heavily on Aristotelian ethics.
This analysis will lead to an exploration of two
specific problems: respect for equal liberty of
individuals, and respect for pluralism.
Equality: a question
of justice?
Over recent decades, debate in political philosophy
on the notion of justice has provided the guiding
thread for theoretical discussions of equality. There
are several different aspects to this thinking. “Fun-
damental justice” concerns equality under the law
and equal rights. “Social justice” relates to reduc-
ing inequalities of resources, equality of access
to social goods and the fair redistribution of the
benefits derived from social cooperation. Gradu-
ally, thinking on equality has become receptive to
new specifications in the requirement for justice,
such as “ethnocultural”, “gender”, “cosmopolitan”
or “global”, “environmental” and “inter-species”
justice. Beyond these specifications, the perva-
siveness of the idea of justice in discussions of
equality can be regarded as a direct sign of the
influence exerted by contemporary political lib-
eralism, and notably by John Rawls’s celebrated
Theory of Justice (1971). Rawls’s work answers the
questions of how we can decide what legitimately
belongs to individuals and what constitutes a just
distribution of goods, whether these are material
(resources and income) or symbolic (responsibili-
ties, social roles and positions, honours), by formu-
lating the two principles of justice – the “principle
of equal liberty” and the “difference principle” –
that underpin the “basic structure” of a just or
“well-ordered” society.
Understood in these terms, the issue of dis-
tributive justice fostered new thinking on equal-
ity. But far from confining itself to questions of
redistribution, the discussion launched by Rawls
expanded onto a terrain that became dominated by
the question of identity. This shift was due mainly
to what has become known as the communitarian
critique of political liberalism. One of the leitmotifs
of communitarianism is precisely that it contests the
primacy accorded by liberals to justice as the organ-
ising and regulating principle of a society in which
equality reigns. The communitarians do not regard
justice, with its supposed impartiality, as being set
above all the specific goods pursued in a society;
justice is a particular good and, as such, can and
must be weighed against other competing ends with,
first among them, the individual and – crucially – the
collective pursuit of a “good life”. The central place
of identity in communitarian thought on equality
stems from the link that these theories establish
between the quest for the “common good” and
individual rootedness in a specific community. This
link is made through the idea of “shared meanings”:
the members of a community are united by a shared
sense of what constitutes a life worth living and by
a set of meanings based on specific visions of the
world and of the good. Hence the attention paid to
the particular identity of the community in deciding
what equality requires.
Far from ruling out any theorisation of
distributive justice, this approach implies a revision
of pathways to equality in light of the primordial
goal of promoting goods that shape the particular
identity of the community. From this emerges a
specifically communitarian conception of equality
and distributive justice, which I shall seek to clarify.
To this end, I will focus on the writings of Alasdair
MacIntyre, Michael Sandel and Charles Taylor,
which have been less analysed on this question
than Michael Walzer, as a result of extensive debate
on his major book, Spheres of justice (1983).
The communitarian critique
of liberal justice
To understand the way that communitarian thinking
has approached the problem of equality and dis-
tributive justice, we must return to the core around
which it was forged in the early 1980s, in the
form of a systematic critique of Rawlsian liberalism
(Sandel 1982). Despite the nuances and, indeed,
divergences separating the authors described rightly
or wrongly as “communitarians”, what unites them
is a critique of liberalism on three main fronts.
At the anthropological level, the communitarians
reject the liberal conception of an “unencumbered”
or “disengaged” self (Sandel 1984), which they
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regard as a chimera and “a mythic invention”
(Walzer 1984, p.324). In the field of ethics, the
communitarians are opposed to the procedural,
deontological, and universalist conception of prac-
tical reason upheld by the liberals, again arguing
that this lacks plausibility and empirical grounding.
At the political level, communitarians highlight the
damage that, in their eyes, liberal theory inflicts on
contemporary democracies, including the fragmen-
tation of political society, the loosening of social
ties, the judicialisation of social relations and the
bureaucratisation of political power. In all three
domains the communitarian indictment is driven
by a common concern to promote visions of the
good without which a community would lose all
substance and cohesion.
As Walzer neatly observes (Walzer 1990, p.8),
“the only theory that is necessary to the communi-
tarian critique of liberalism is liberalism itself”. The
same is true of communitarian thinking on equality,
which began with an attempt to oppose the model
that Taylor calls “rights-liberalism” (Taylor 1992a,
p.53). In Taylor’s view this is a model of society
that gives unconditional primacy to the rights of the
individual, foregrounding individual independence
and state neutrality with respect to divergent con-
ceptions of the good life. The problem with this
model is that the individual is guaranteed rights
“that he can make efficacious if necessary even
against the process of collective decision making of
the society, against the majority will, or the prevail-
ing consensus” (Taylor 1993, p.92). Thus “rights-
liberalism” is suspected of judicialising social rela-
tions and democratic life as a whole, increasing
the polarisation of society into competing interests
and blocking the emergence of compromise (Taylor
1995, p.284). In Taylor’s words, “Its spirit is an
adversarial one in which citizen efficacy consists
in being able to get your rights, whatever the
consequences for the whole” (Taylor 1992, p.117).
Here Taylor is challenging a conception of justice
that encourages individuals to defend their own
interests, whether or not they impede the collective
goods and purposes by which the community is
ethically guided and politically united. In doing
this, liberals become unable to make a plausible
response to the problem of solidarity.
This critique is particularly aimed at the two
principles of justice that Rawls (1971) adopts,
placing them in “lexical order”. The “principle of
equal liberty” pertains to fundamental justice and
states that “each person has an equal right to a
fully adequate scheme of equal basic rights and
liberties, which scheme is compatible with a similar
scheme for all” (Rawls 1985, p.227). In other words,
the public institutions of a state governed by the
rule of law must be able to guarantee that all
citizens receive the same respect for their basic
liberties and fundamental rights. Secondly, Rawls
defines distributive justice as being composed of
“the principle of fair opportunity” and the “dif-
ference principle”. These two together govern the
fair distribution of opportunities, incomes, and the
“social bases of self-respect”: “Social and economic
inequalities are to satisfy two conditions: first, they
must be attached to offices and positions open to
all under conditions of fair equality of opportunity;
and second, they must be to the greatest benefit of
the least advantaged members of society” (Rawls
1985, p.227). It is this definition of justice that forms
the object of communitarian critiques in relation to
equality and distributive justice.
Community commitment as a
condition of equality
For the communitarians there is nothing in liberal
theory to explain what motivates citizens to consent
to the efforts and sacrifices called for an egalitarian
policy of redistribution and, in this case, the appli-
cation of the “difference principle”. For them this
failure stems from the liberals’ visceral refusal to
subscribe to an anthropological approach that could
be described as “constitutivist” in the sense that it
expresses the properly constitutive nature of com-
munity. The communitarians indeed assert that the
identity of the self is inevitably situated and embed-
ded in a framework of “shared meanings” inherited
from the community they belong to. This means
that the self cannot be accessed other than through
a narrative, dialogue, or interpretation appealing to
values that are intrinsically and irreducibly common
and not simply convergent (Taylor 1995, pp.127–
145). It then becomes necessary to break with the
atomistic and contractualist vision of community
maintained by the liberals. Far from being “a
possible aim of antecedently individuated selves”,
community is, in Sandel’s terms, “an ingredient or
constituent of their identity as such” (Sandel 1982,
p.64).
This thesis forms the basis of the communi-
tarian position on distributive justice, as set out
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by Sandel: “Since others made me, and in various
ways continue to make me the person I am, it seems
appropriate to regard them, in so far as I can identify
them, as participants in ‘my’ achievements and
common beneficiaries of the rewards they bring”
(Sandel 1982, p.143). He then goes on to establish
a close link between this form of solidarity and
the “sense of participation in the achievements
and endeavors of (certain) others”. These “certain
others” in fact correspond to the members of a
particular, restricted community which tends not
to extend beyond the people of a given nation.
This anthropological starting point fosters an
approach to equality and distributive justice from
the perspective of determining what we owe to the
community. MacIntyre takes this the furthest: “It
follows that I find my justification for allegiance to
these rules of morality in my particular community;
deprived of the life of that community, I would
have no reason to be moral” (MacIntyre 2002,
p.49). Here again, according to MacIntyre, the
individual’s identity debt in relation to his or her
particular community stems from the constitutive
nature of that community: “What I am, therefore,
is in key part what I inherit, a specific past that
is present to some degree in my present. I find
myself part of a history and that is generally to say,
whether I like it or not, whether I recognize it or not,
one of the bearers of a tradition” (MacIntyre 2007,
p.221). Without a recognition of this “obligation
to belong” (Taylor 1985), the need for solidarity
and defence of the “principle of difference” would
lose all moral foundation. This is the argument
developed in detail by Sandel: “on the cooperative
vision of community alone, it is unclear what the
moral basis for this sharing could be. Short of the
constitutive conception, deploying an individual’s
assets for the sake of the common good would seem
an offense against the ‘plurality and distinctness’ of
individuals this liberalism seeks above all to secure”
(Sandel 1984, pp.89–90).
In addition, the “constitutivist” premise is seen
as crucial to the provision of a basic motivation
for distributive justice. According to Sandel, the
feelings of gratitude, pride, and loyalty inspired
in individuals by belonging to a tradition and a
way of life that they experience as a constituent
part of themselves are motives powerful enough to
validate a policy of redistribution: “The justification
of my sacrifice, if it can be called a sacrifice, is
not the abstract assurance that unknown others will
gain more than I will lose, but the rather more
compelling notion that by my efforts I contribute
to the realization of a way of life in which I take
pride and with which my identity is bound. [ . . . ] I
could [ . . . ] take pride in my fitness to contribute in
this way, and this fitness, perhaps even more than
the benefits I might glean, would be just cause for
celebration” (Sandel 1982, p.143).
This means replacing the Rawlsian idea of
fairness (as it emerges from the “difference prin-
ciple”) by a model of equality and distribution
that draws on the feeling of indebtedness towards
the community, placing the virtue of desert at the
forefront of public life.
From “indebtedness” to the
virtue of “desert”
As we have seen, the feeling of indebtedness to
the community is a pivot of the communitarian
understanding of equality and distributive justice.
According to Taylor, this kind of feeling is
intuitively attached to “our notion of justice”:
“In any attempt to do good, all those who are
authentically engaged benefit from the contribution
of the others. They are all, in a sense, indebted
to each other” (Taylor 1988, p.52). However, he
explains that, “because some will make a more
singular contribution than others, the mutual
debt will not be entirely equal” (Taylor 1988,
p.52). Here, the unequal nature of the efforts and
sacrifices made in order to bring about the common
good opens the way to a differentiated vision of the
distribution of social roles and resources. Those
members of the community more actively engaged
in ensuring its identity continues and flourishes –
or simply survives – can legitimately receive more
than others. But then, this criterion of differentiated
distribution does not call for procedural rules stip-
ulating which are the beneficiaries who “work for
the good of the least fortunate” (Rawls 1971, p.87).
Rather, it calls for evaluative judgements, which
is why, from a theoretical point of view, there is a
need to determine what language or notion might
be used to justify unequal distribution of this kind.
What communitarian authors such as Sandel
and MacIntyre have in common is their reincorpo-
ration of the republican rhetoric of desert within
the framework of their own thought. Here again, by
adopting the “constitutivist” premise, reinforced
by a “conception of possession” that inverts the
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Rawlsian vision of the self, Sandel foregrounds
the notion of desert in determining distributive
justice: “For claims of desert presuppose thickly-
constituted selves, beings capable of possession
in the constitutive sense” (Sandel 1982, p.178).
In a “fair meritocracy”, he explains (Sandel 1982,
p.68), access to elevated social positions and the
attribution of a larger share are based on personal
achievements, seen as being of superior value.
Thus, the acceptability of individual claims for
redistribution of social advantages is conditional
to desert being assessed by the members of the
society. From this perspective, the share given to
each is related not to a “primordial right”, nor even
to the satisfaction of “legitimate expectations”,
but is determined “in virtue of qualities I possess”
and not – as it was for Rawls – “in the weak
accidental sense”, but “in the strong, constitutive
sense” (Sandel 1982, pp.71–72). So what matters
is not to “have the right” to a fair redistribution, but
to deserve the unequal (i.e., superior) share with
which the community rewards “those qualities
most plausibly regarded as essential to a person’s
identity – one’s character, values, core convictions,
and deepest loyalties” (Sandel 1982, p.74).
This approach to desert reaffirms the centrality
of community and social frameworks in defining
the qualities of the self. But the impact of the
community is even stronger. For what earns an
individual recognition of desert is less the intrinsic
nature of the qualities that person “possesses”
but the more profound fact that the virtue con-
nected to these qualities has a pre-existing or pre-
institutional moral status. In other words what
determines the share due to each is not based on
whether the institutions themselves are just or not,
or more broadly, on any other consideration of
justice (Sandel 1982, p.77). Clearly, the distinction
posited between “noble” and “inferior” qualities,
and the priority accorded to those placed highest in
the moral hierarchy of a given community shatter
the liberal ideal of the “value neutrality of the state”.
This leads to a “perfectionist” politics in which the
state sheds all the constraints of neutrality in order to
publicly promote the community’s “particular val-
ues” linked to visions of the good. These values rep-
resent the practical application of that community’s
conception of equality and distributive justice.
On the same bases and with the same con-
sequences, MacIntyre too turns to the virtue of
desert to counter political liberalism. Because this
virtue is central to our intuitive understanding of
what we owe to others, distributive justice demands,
he believes, that desert be affirmed as the most
important value of society and, as such, as a matter
of moral consensus. The refusal of this demand
by both liberals and libertarians leads MacIntyre
to lump them together. Despite their differences,
which MacIntyre regards as superficial, Rawls and
Nozick are similar in their wish to assert the
anteriority and primacy of the individual over the
community, an assertion that drives them to defend
an ethically neutral understanding of the political
bond. Therefore the virtue of desert is excluded
from their theories of justice: “Neither of them make
any reference to desert in their account of justice,
nor could they consistently do so. [ . . . ] It is in any
case clear that for both Nozick and Rawls a society
is composed of individuals, each with his or her
own interest, who then have to come together and
formulate common rules of life” (MacIntyre 2002,
pp.249–250). He explains: “the notion of desert is
at home only in the context of a community whose
primary bond is a shared understanding both of the
good for man and of the good of that community and
where individuals identify their primary interests
with reference to those goods” (MacIntyre 2007,
p.250).
The core idea behind this meritocratic con-
ception is that the definition of social roles and
the distribution of social positions and advantages
must recognise the relative importance of individ-
ual contributions to the achievement of collective
goals, judged as morally superior. In line with a
perfectionist vision of the state as resolutely non-
neutral from a moral and/or cultural point of view,
this communitarian model of distributive justice
starts by overturning the priority of justice over
the good, which results in the opposition between
holism and atomism becoming more radical. For the
communitarians, grounding their argument in this
way enables them to adopt a position diametrically
opposed to that of Rawls when he states that a
well-ordered society is not at all defined by a
“set of agreed ends by reference to which the
potential social contributions of an individual could
be assessed” (Rawls 1977, p.162). According to
Rawls, the communitarian definition of a well-
ordered society as having “an aim that ranks the
expected contributions [of all its citizens] and on
that basis determines their social role” runs counter
to the very idea of justice. He adds: “The notion of
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an individual’s contribution to society as itself an
association falls away” (Rawls 1977, p.162).
The hierarchy of goods and
“proportional equality”
From a communitarian perspective, redistribution
is governed by the hierarchy of goods prevailing in
a given social context. Thus, Taylor explains: “To
understand the requirements of distributive justice
in any given society, we must understand the kind
of society that it is. Societies are communities that
are constituted by the realization of common goods.
The question of which good should be distributed
and to whom will depend on the community’s
goals and the way that these are realized” (Taylor
1988, p.52).
On the basis of this postulate, Taylor upholds
a model of distributive justice based on the relative
importance of community goods. In line with his
ethics of plural goods (Pe´labay 2001, pp.115–184),
Taylor builds this model on a contextualised
conception of practical reason which, according to
his own expectations, “will not seek to construct
formulas that depend as little as possible on
context, but will rather seek to better articulate
what the context involves” (Taylor 1988, p.51).
In this approach, the evaluative dimension of any
given term can be grasped only in the light of
the “frameworks [that] provide the background,
explicit or implicit, for our moral judgements,
intuitions, or reactions” (Taylor 1989, p.26) and
proceed from the sharing of goods and goals within
the ethical life of a community. To know whether a
term such as “courage”, “brutality”, or “gratitude”
has a moral meaning, “one needs an understanding
of the kind of social interchange, the common
purposes, or mutual needs, how things go well or
badly between people in the society where this term
is current.” (Taylor 1989, p.54). In Taylor’s view
the same is true of fair distribution, which must
be conducted according to the “situational” value
of the hypergoods that have shaped a particular
context of “shared meanings” over the long term.
The objective is to develop a model that makes
it possible to combine several goods in their just
proportions or, more precisely, to build a non-
exclusive hierarchy that respects the plurality of
the “constitutive goods” of the collective identity,
all of which are valid but where “each receives his
rightful place” (Taylor 1988, p.44). This is how
Taylor resists the “strategy originating in Kant,
which consists in stating that all goods except for
the one we favour are systematically ranked as
inferior” (Taylor 1997, p.294).
With these words Taylor contests the priority
given to justice, which has come to eclipse all other
competing goods. However, he is careful to stress
that this critique does not mean that “justice is
not important, or less important than the Kantians
think”, or that it can be reduced to the anti-
humanism of the neo-Nietzscheans (Taylor 1997,
p.294). Taylor’s view (1997, p.295) is that we must
avoid giving “systematic priority” to pre-defined
principles of justice, since this “leads to pragmatic
absurdity”. Sandel adopts a similar stance when
he states that the “compensatory” nature of justice
prevents the existence of any architectonic prin-
ciple, including justice itself: “One consequence
of the remedial aspect of justice is that we cannot
say in advance whether, in any particular instance,
an increase in justice is associated with an overall
moral improvement” (Sandel 1982, p.32). For him,
“[t]he breakdown of certain personal and civic
attachments may represent a moral loss that even
a full measure of justice cannot redeem” (Sandel
1982, p.33).
From a communitarian perspective, no formal
criterion, no single “principle” can define distribu-
tive justice unless we leave real life and our every-
day moral experience behind. To preserve redis-
tribution practices from the abstraction implied by
the liberal approach, Taylor adopts an “Aristotelian
principle of ‘proportional’ equality”, set out as fol-
lows: “While all have a share in the good – because
this is the principle underpinning the community,
and this is what Aristotle means by the equality that
defines justice – it is clear that we owe more to those
who have made a signal contribution” (Taylor 1988,
p.52). Taylor acknowledges that, when combined
with an ethics of honour, Aristotle’s concept of
proportional equality can uphold an inequality that
is incompatible with democratic ideals. However,
he believes that this concept has its place in the
framework of the “modern self”. Furthermore he
considers that it provides an appropriate response
to demands for solidarity. According to him, one of
the advantages of adopting the Aristotelian model is
the unique opportunity it supplies of recognising the
existence and the worth of a plurality of competing
goods. Once again, the Rawlsian approach of organ-
ising principles of justice into an intangible “lexical
C© 2017 John Wiley & Sons Ltd
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order” is invalidated here. For Taylor as for Walzer,
the quest for just distribution is based on a process
of arbitration between divergent goods: “what is
just in a particular society involves combining
mutually irreducible principles in a weighting that
is appropriate for the particular society, given its
history, economy, degree of integration” (Taylor
1985a, pp.312–313).
All the above communitarian arguments result
in an asymmetrical model of distributive justice that
recognises the contribution made by each individual
in the pursuit of the collective goals and seeks to
respect the situational value of the community’s
“constitutive goods”. This theoretical framework
accords legitimacy to inequalities stemming from a
form of redistribution that rewards those individuals
most inclined to work to achieve the authentic goals
of the community to which they belong.
Beyond liberal equality? The
limits and dangers of the
communitarian critique
In this study I have examined the arguments put
forward by authors such as MacIntyre, Sandel, and
Taylor to develop a communitarian understanding
of equality and, more precisely, of distributive
justice. They seek to make equality subject to a
“politics of the common good” as, for them, this
is a matter of survival for the political community.
The aim of the communitarians is to preserve
“the continuing health of self-governing societies”
(Taylor 1989, p.505). For them, this is achievable
by protecting the store of shared meanings which
provide authenticity to the collective identity, by
making the political body more morally robust
and/or by reinforcing a sense of civic belonging
which ensures the legitimacy of public institutions
and the loyalty of citizens. At this point emerges
the republican side of communitarian critiques.
It appears in the work of Sandel who advocates
freedom as collective self-government to remedy
“our impoverished civic life” (Sandel 1996, p.6), in
Taylor’s (1995, pp.181–203) arguments in favour
of positive liberty and civic humanism, and in the
very virile rhetoric used by MacIntyre (2002) in
support of a “morality of patriotism”.
Faced with the scale and intensity of the cri-
tiques advanced by the communitarians, the ques-
tion arises as to whether their politics of the
common good has not undermined the conceptual
foundations and practical justifications under-
pinning liberal egalitarianism. Answering in the
affirmative, some commentators have followed
Stephen Holmes (1989) in identifying several
characteristics of the antiliberal tradition in
communitarian thinking. It is true that at the
height of the controversy the communitarian
position was akin to a “reaction” (Sosoe 1999) to
political liberalism and the hegemony it exerted
over contemporary political thought. Nevertheless,
communitarian authors – or at least those described
by Buchanan as “moderate” to the extent that
their approach “acknowledges individual civil and
political rights but denies that they have the sort of
priority the liberal attributes to them” (Buchanan
1989, p.855) – stated their intention, not to reject the
liberal paradigm head-on but rather to subject it to a
major revision or, in the words of Walzer, to apply a
“periodic communitarian correction” to liberalism
in order to “reinforce its internal associative
capacities” (Walzer 1990, pp.21–22). When applied
to a communitarian understanding of equality, this
intent must be scrutinised and the difficulties to
which this understanding gives rise analysed.
To start with, from a strictly theoretical
point of view, there is a problem of internal
coherence. If the theoretical foundations of
liberal doctrine are as denuded of empirical
content as the communitarians say, it is hard to
understand how these same ideals might have the
powerfully damaging material effects on society
that their critiques alarmingly suggest. There
is a contradiction here between the criticisms
formulated at the anthropological and ethical levels
and those that stem from the political domain.
Crucially, do the concrete repercussions of the
communitarian critique validate the hypothesis of a
simple inflection of the liberal paradigm of equality,
or do they in fact overturn that paradigm? This
question immediately arises on reading MacIntyre,
for whom opposition to liberal theory is confined to
“a global critique of modernity”, as noted by Lukas
Sosoe (1992, p.140). However, even when we seek
to examine more nuanced positions, we still need to
know the real scope of the reorganisation of liberal
egalitarianism brought about by the communitarian
approach. Let us note, with Justine Lacroix (2003,
p.134), that, as a general rule, the writings of
communitarian thinkers offer few clues as to what
their philosophical model of political integration
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might consist of in practical terms. Moreover, the
few illustrations available tend to reveal certain
unresolved tensions between the implementation of
the idea of “proportional equality” on the one hand,
and respect for individual liberties and pluralism on
the other. This is what I shall examine in reference
to the practical positions adopted by Taylor in a
number of public debates in Quebec.
Taylor and the dilemmas of
communitarian equality
As we have seen, the communitarian vision of
distributive justice requires that we accept the
historical, geographic, and cultural variation of
criteria used to define justice and “fair” distribution.
If we follow Taylor, this variability undoubtedly
marks the abandonment of individualistic, atomistic
thinking, but it seems not to call for the renunciation
of what he calls “trans-societal criteria of right”
(Taylor 1985a, p.302). It remains the case that the
replacement of a universalist conception of rights
with an approach that is simply transcultural does
nothing to soothe concerns relating to a potential
conflict between the enjoyment of basic liberties
and the realisation of collective ends, particularly
the aim of identity survival. This is all the more so as
the very possibility of such conflict results directly
from the application of communitarian logic to the
issue of distributive justice. As asserted by Taylor
(1985a, p.302), “To try to make a society more
distributively just is to try to make it conform
more to the constitutive understandings shared in
its membership. To try to make a society absolutely
just, or bring it closer to absolute justice, or to some
other good, may well be to subvert and destroy
the constitutive understandings”. This dilemma
between distributive and fundamental justice is only
likely to arise in a theoretical framework in which
the principle of equal liberty no longer has any
priority but can, on the contrary, be weighed against
the “good of the community”, notably the insistance
that its collective identity be protected.
For Taylor, the existence of this dilemma,
explicitly accepted by him, demands a form of
arbitration based on his proportionalist ethics.
This involves weighing the “constitutive goods”
of collective identity according to their “relative
importance”. Applying this exercise to Quebec as
a “society [ . . . ] the majority core of which con-
stitutes the justification for a political project, but
which also includes other groups”, Taylor (1996,
p.363) advocates “separating what is unconditional
and non-negotiable on the one hand from that
which can be discussed and modified through social
deliberation on the other”. He then draws the
following conclusion in relation to Quebec: “it is
clear, for example, that fundamental rights and the
predominance of the French language fall into the
first category”. Taylor justifies this assessment in
terms of the constitutivist conception of identity and
the aim to ensure the “survival” of the goods of the
community: “If these elements were to disappear,
the society would lose all definition”. However, he
also warns that, “if the first category grows too
large, it cuts short the discussion between partners,
thereby rendering it fictional” (Taylor 1996, p.363).
The warning thus formulated does not relate
only to the option of “renewed federalism” favoured
by Taylor (1993) over national independence for
Quebec. It also relates to the preservation of a
plurality of goods in Quebec society. But even at
this level, assessing the importance of the different
elements seems no easy exercise, since there may
be a clash between the “constitutive goods” that
Taylor places in the same “first category” requiring
“unconditional respect”. This is illustrated by the
example of the French Language Charter (known
as “law 101”) seeking to protect the use of French
in Quebec. By imposing restrictions on the right of
access to non-French-speaking schools, the Charter
manifests a tension between, on the one hand, the
protection of a language regarded as constitutive
of Quebec identity and, on the other, respect for
the individual freedom of (foreign) parents to send
their children to the school of their choice. Making
this individual liberty – regarded by some as a
fundamental right – conditional to the survival
of the linguistic identity of the majority group
surely means judging that, for migrants at any rate,
choice of school is not one of “the fundamental
liberties – those which should never at any time
be infringed and which therefore ought to be unas-
sailably entrenched”. For migrants, it is one of the
“privileges and immunities which are important
but can be revoked or restricted for reasons of
public policy (although one needs a strong reason
to do so)” (Taylor 1993, pp.176–177). But, if this
is so, surely it amounts to deciding in favour
of the majority community and its identity-based
demands to the detriment of the equal liberty of
individuals.
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This question is all the more delicate as,
beyond its linguistic dimension, it also affects the
equally if not more difficult question of respect for
pluralism and ethnocultural diversity in Quebec.
This is a goal to which Taylor (1992a), the advocate
of the “politics of recognition”, is clearly attached.
Taylor’s work as a whole is underpinned by the
desire to reconcile – sometimes at the price of a
certain ambivalence – the importance of community
belonging with both respect for individual liberties,
as we have seen, and the recognition of difference.
Here again tensions arise, which relate to the diffi-
culty of simultaneously adopting a communitarian
logic and a multiculturalist approach.
It is this second dilemma of communitar-
ian equality that is revealed through the posi-
tions adopted by Taylor in public debate in Que-
bec on the “reasonable accommodations crisis”
(2006–2008) and the “Charter of Values” (2013–
2014). In the report that Taylor and Bouchard
submitted at the end of their presidency of the
Commission de consultation sur les pratiques
d’accommodement relie´es aux diffe´rences cul-
turelles (Bouchard and Taylor 2008), “Quebec
interculturalism” was upheld as a model of integra-
tion that “seeks to reconcile ethnocultural diversity
with the continuity of the French-speaking core and
the preservation of the social link. It thus affords
security to Quebecers of French-Canadian origin
and to ethnocultural minorities and protects the
rights of all in keeping with the liberal tradition.”
(Bouchard and Taylor 2008, p.40). Whereas many
of the communitarian ideas developed by Taylor
at the philosophical level – notably the “obligation
to belong” (Taylor 1985) and the Herderian ideal
of authenticity (Taylor 1979) – tended towards the
promotion and indeed protection of the collec-
tive identity, his practical positions diverge from
this approach. Primarily concerned by the com-
bined trends towards uniformisation and exclusion
implicit in the demands of the majority group for
affirmation of their identity and cultural survival,
Taylor opposes the promotion of secularism as an
“identity marker” of the dominant group. Favouring
the expression of a broad religious diversity, he
sets aside his communitarian hostility to the liberal
priority of equal liberty. He bases his argument on
respect for the basic individual rights, in partic-
ular freedom of conscience (Taylor and Maclure
2010), thus undertaking a kind of liberal, Rawlsian
“turn” (Gagnon 2012) in passing from theory to
practice.
My conclusion is clearly not that communi-
tarian thinkers see the preservation of community
identity as a justification for the violation of funda-
mental rights and basic individual liberties. Indeed,
the reverse is true of Taylor, as described above.
However, it should be noted that communitarian
logic in itself offers little to counter the subordi-
nation of the principle of equality (in the sense of
both fundamental and distributive justice) to the
majority group’s desire to protect “its” collective
identity from “Others” who are seen as a threat
to it. This means that the question of whether a
particular threshold is crossed, and more precisely
whether liberal equality is or is not endangered in
the attempt to secure identity, is not so much a
matter of theoretical elucidation as “a matter of
political nerve”, to quote Damico (2016, p.407) on
“liberal perfectionism”. In other words, questions
of principle are played out on a political terrain:
do public discourses, political decisions and public
policies as they exist in a given situation maintain
the status of equality as a principle of justice of
primary importance? Yet what the political context
of the early twenty-first century precisely reveals
is a series of worrying signs which reflect mistrust
of any project encouraging openness and plurality
among the citizenry, whether fostered by immigra-
tion, European integration, or globalisation. These
signs can be observed in glorifications of national
identity, the growing opposition between “us” and
“them” (a category to which Muslims are largely
confined) and the rise of conservative, populist
movements spreading a moralistic, culturalist (and
indeed religious) interpretation of how to preserve
national identity and its constitutive “values”. These
trends towards homogeneity and a society closing
in on itself translate into a growing scorn for
the checks and balances of procedural justice and
for a system of rights that prevents the reduction
of democracy to the sovereignty of the people.
Taken together, all these elements form a back-
ground which has the potential to subvert the
principle of equality, at the very heart of both
fundamental and distributive justice, by means of
an identity politics promoted by national majori-
ties. This provides one more reason to avoid the
perils of adopting a communitarian approach to
equality.
C© 2017 John Wiley & Sons Ltd
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